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Sri Lankan boat people
I want to talk about Bill C-4. Th e Bill has the title “Th e 
Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s 
Immigration System Act.” It was introduced into Parliament 
on 15 October 2011. It is still at the fi rst reading stage.
Although the legislation is not country specifi c, its pre-
decessor, Bill C-49 was introduced in October 2010 into the 
minority Parliament in response to the arrival of Tamil boat 
people, 76 aboard the MV Ocean Lady in October 2009 and 
492 aboard the MV Sun Sea in August 2010. Th e Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration, the Honourable Jason 
Kenney, on second reading in the House of Commons, jus-
tifi ed the proposed legislation by reference to these arriv-
als1. Th ese arrivals were a tiny component of those from Sri 
Lanka fl eeing persecution and seeking resettlement.
Th e legislation died in the last Parliament because in that 
Parliament the Conservative government was in the minor-
ity and none of the opposition parties would support it. Th e 
Conservative government in this Parliament has a majority 
and has reintroduced the legislation.
Sri Lanka ended in May 2009 a long brutal civil war 
between the the Government of Sri Lanka and the minor-
ity Tamil forces who sought an independent country in the 
north of Sri Lanka. Th e war, which went on for twenty six 
years, resulted in 80,000 deaths. It culminated in a frenzy of 
killing and mass detention of Tamil civilians.
Tamils in Sri Lanka continue to be victimized by the 
victors in the war. Th e systemic discrimination, harass-
ment and persecution of minority Tamils by elements of the 
majority which sparked the civil war continues with a ven-
geance now that the Tamil side has lost that war.
Refugee protection and resettlement for Tamil victims, 
even during the height of the civil war, was never easy. Th ere 
were too many claimants and there was not enough political 
will. All sorts of evasive devices were used to prevent the 
theoretical commitment to protect refugees from translat-
ing into the numbers the civil war merited.
As diffi  cult as protection and resettlement for Sri Lankan 
refugees were before the end of the civil war, they all but 
collapsed since. Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are now caught 
between a fi ction of change of circumstances ending the 
threat of persecution and the reality of persecution back 
home.
Th e standard refrain from refugee determination tri-
bunals and resettlement offi  cers is that now that the civil 
war has ended neither protection nor resettlement is neces-
sary. Th e facts on the ground though tell the opposite story. 
Persecution for some Tamils has worsened since the civil 
war has ended, because the protective enclave which once 
existed for Tamils in the north of the island is gone.
Th ose who had fl ed to countries of proximate refuge in 
the region are stuck. Because of the dangers they face in Sri 
Lanka, they can not go back home. Resettlement countries 
will not take them. Yet they can not stay where they are.
Countries in the region where Sri Lankan asylum seek-
ers are found are not signatories to the Refugee Convention 
and do not respect refugee rights. Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Th ailand all tell the same sorry tale. Refugees can not work 
legally. If they work illegally, they are exploited by employ-
ers without remedy. Refugees work long hours at low pay at 
menial tasks in unsafe and unhealthy working conditions 
for abusive employers. Th eir children can not go to school. 
Th eir movements are restricted. Th ey suff er from food short-
ages and inadequate medical treatment at high costs. Th ey 
are denied documentation and are harassed by the police. 
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Some are detained in crowded, unsanitary, unhealthy con-
ditions. Th ey face the threat of forcible repatriation.
Malaysia introduced an amnesty for illegal migrant 
workers starting August 1st of this year. Asylum seekers are 
ineligible.
Tamil refugees have taken as best they can the situation 
into their own hands. Th ey have become a new boat people, 
fl eeing the countries in the region in which they were caught, 
seeking at risk to their lives, to get protection in resettle-
ment countries—Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Th e 
arrivals on the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea were 
part of this outfl ow.
B. Vietnamese boat people
We have seen this sad story many times before, refugees 
fl eeing persecution and seeking resettlement by ship and 
boat. Before I turn to the details of Bill C-4, I want to go 
back to how Canada and the world reacted to another group 
of refugees fl eeing persecution and seeking resettlement by 
boat and ship, the Vietnamese boat people.
Th e American military withdrew from Vietnam in 
August 1973 leaving to the South Vietnamese the defence 
of South Vietnam against the attacks from North Vietnam 
and the Viet Cong. South Vietnam fell to the Viet Cong 
and North Vietnam in April 1975. Th e collapse of South 
Vietnam led to a massive fl ight of refugees from Vietnam.
Th e Indochinese designated class
Th e Government of Canada in response created the pri-
vate sponsorship system, which exists to this day, and 
the Indochinese designated class. Regulations said that a 
Canadian organization or group of fi ve individuals could 
sponsor a person from designated countries in Indochina 
to come to Canada.
Until September 1990 the countries designated were 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. According to the regula-
tions, a person from but residing outside these countries 
could come to Canada, as long as the person had a sponsor 
here. Th e Government of Canada also assisted people from 
this class to come to Canada under the Government refugee 
allocation for South East Asia.
Th ere was no need for an applicant to prove that he or 
she was a refugee. Th e applicant did not have to prove a 
well founded fear of persecution. Dislocation and sponsor-
ship were enough, provided the person could show likeli-
hood of successful establishment and criminal and medical 
admissibility.
Th e Indochinese designated class was one of the most 
successful programs the Immigration Department ever 
ran. Th e class began 7 December 1978. At least in theory, it 
remained in eff ect for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia till 1 
September 1990. Most of the large numbers of Vietnamese 
who came to Canada came by virtue of this class. In 1979–
1980 alone, some 60,000 were admitted.
Th ough it remained in eff ect in theory till September 
1990, it ceased operation aft er 14 June 1989 for Vietnamese 
and Laotians arriving in Hong Kong aft er 16 June 1988 or 
in any other Southeast Asian country aft er March 14, 1989. 
While keeping the program on the books as a regulation, 
the Government ceased to operate it administratively for 
new arrivals.
Th e Comprehensive Plan of Action
Th e United Nations held an International Conference on 
Indochinese refugees in Geneva on June 13 and 14, 1989. 
Prior to the Geneva Conference, the U.N. held a preparatory 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 8 March 1989.
Th e Malaysian meeting proposed a draft  declaration 
and comprehensive plan of action on Indochinese refugees. 
Th e Geneva meeting accepted the draft . According to the 
plan, resettlement of refugees from Indochina would cease, 
except for those who passed screening procedures.
Th e declaration that accompanied the plan stated that 
governments were preoccupied with the burden imposed 
on neighbouring territories by asylum seekers. Th e dec-
laration also stated that governments were alarmed current 
arrangements to deal with asylum seekers might no longer 
be responsive to the size of the problem.
Th e plan itself had three key components: the establish-
ment of screening procedures, repatriation of those who 
failed screening, and resettlement of those who passed 
screening. Early establishment of consistent region wide 
refugee status determination processes was required under 
the plan. According to the plan, the status of asylum seekers 
had to be determined by a qualifi ed national authority, in 
accordance with established refugee criteria and procedures.
Th e criteria recognized were not restricted to the 1951 
Convention. Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other relevant international instruments had to be 
borne in mind and applied in a humanitarian spirit.
Th e Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status was to serve as an authorita-
tive and interpretative guide and there was to be a right of 
appeal, with the asylum seeker entitled to advice on appeal. 
Th e UNHCR was to ensure proper and consistent func-
tioning of the procedures and application of the criteria.
Resettlement was divided into two categories one for long 
stayers, and the other for newly determined refugees. Long 
stayers were all those who arrived before a cut off  date (the 
date screening was established). Long stayers were eligible 
for resettlement without going through screening.
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For those who arrived aft er the cut off  date, only those 
who passed screening were eligible for resettlement. Th e 
plan said a resettlement program would accommodate all 
those who arrived aft er the introduction of status determin-
ation procedures and were determined to be refugees.
Th e plan went on to say that persons determined not to be 
refugees should return to their country of origin. Th e Chair 
of the Geneva Conference that adopted the plan in June 
1989, Dato Haji Abu Hassan Bin Haji Omar of Malaysia, in 
his closing statement, indicated that the plan’s purpose was 
to discourage Vietnamese from leaving Vietnam. He said 
“asylum seekers could no longer assume that they would be 
automatically regarded as refugees and therefore entitled to 
automatic resettlement.”
Canadian problems
Th ere were a number of problems with this structure. One 
was that it had no refl ection in Canadian law for over a 
year. Th e second was that it was an abdication of Canadian 
sovereignty, delegating Canadian refugee determinations 
to foreign entities. Th e third was the inadequacy of foreign 
screening.
Elaborating on these problems here would take me too 
far afi eld. If someone is interested in them, I have discussed 
them at length in an article published in 1991 in the maga-
zine Refuge.2
Th e Elysia
I would not now suggest a designated class for Sri Lankan 
refugees. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, as Communist 
states, had exit controls. Sri Lanka does not. Vietnamese 
refugees had to leave Vietnam by boat because the 
Government would not let them leave. Sri Lankans can 
leave Sri Lanka, provided they can get visas from the coun-
tries of destination.
Th e imposition of exit controls imposes a limit on the 
number of people who can and will leave. If there are no 
exit controls and no or minimal entry controls either, large 
numbers of people may leave many of whom have no sub-
stantive claim to refugee protection.
An agreement akin to the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
between countries of proximate refuge and countries of 
resettlement for Sri Lankan and other refugees in the 
region is a more plausible option. Countries of proximate 
refuge would screen. Resettlement countries would take 
the screened in. Th e screened out would be repatriated. 
Th e Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees would supervise the application of the plan.
Th at is an option I canvassed with the Offi  ce of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. I 
became involved in the plight of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees 
because of another boat, 87 Sri Lankan refugees aboard the 
ship MV Elysia at Tanjung Pinang port Indonesia. Th e refu-
gees had left  Malaysia destined for New Zealand, but were 
stopped July 10th this year en route by the Indonesian water 
police in Indonesian waters.
Th e refugees refused to disembark not wanting to end up 
in a situation in Indonesia as bad as the situation they left  in 
Malaysia. New Zealand refused to take them.
Th e Government of Indonesia stated that it would not 
use force to impose disembarkation on the passengers of 
the Elysia. Th e Government has also stated that it would 
give access to food supplies and medical care, but neither 
the Government nor the UNHCR nor the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) actually provided food 
supplies and medical care in a sustained manner to the pas-
sengers. Aft er running out of food and water, the refugees 
on August 26th disembarked and were put into Indonesian 
detention. Th ey are now going through UNHCR registra-
tion and refugee determination. Th ey have been moved so 
I have been told from detention to IOM reception centres.
I went in early September, on behalf of this group, to 
Geneva to meet with the Offi  ce of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees to see what could be done to 
help them. Th e offi  cials with whom I met stated:
Th e Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees is opposed to detention of asylum seekers. Th e 
UNHCR promotes alternatives to detention.
Indonesia had before allowed asylum seekers freedom, 
but recently enacted legislation which provided for deten-
tion and began detaining some of them, as the result of the 
pressure of other states. I presume they were referring to 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand although no states 
were mentioned.
Indonesian reaction to eff orts to cease detention is to 
point to Australia, which also detains asylum seekers.
Releasing asylum seekers to reception centres is consider-
ably cheaper for the Government of Indonesia than keeping 
them in detention.
Other states in the region do not detain asylum seekers.
Th e passengers on the boat Elysia came from Malaysia. 
Th ey were not detained there.
Th e IOM has reception centres in Indonesia which could 
serve as alternatives to detention. Th e reception centres may 
need to be refurbished or expanded. Th e reception centres 
can not become detention centres.
Indonesia is not releasing asylum seekers it wants to 
detain aft er UNHCR registration or even aft er UNHCR 
recognition. Rather it is waiting until there are resettlement 
off ers for the refugees.
Th ere are NGOs who are monitoring the situation in 
detention of asylum seekers and making reports.
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UNHCR registration of asylum seekers whether in deten-
tion or not happens almost immediately, within a week. 
Refugee determination is taking six to seven months.
Th e UNHCR will accelerate refugee determination for 
those they identify through registration as vulnerable.
Th e UNHCR, in addition to pressing for alternatives to 
detention for all detainees, is asking specifi cally that women 
and children be released in conformity with the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Indonesia is not a party to the 
Refugee Convention but is a party to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Th at Convention commits state parties 
to ensure that children have access to education. Children 
can not have that access when they are in detention.
Th e UNHCR is not encouraging a comprehensive plan 
of action patterned on the Vietnamese boat people model 
with resettlement states agreeing to resettle those asy-
lum seekers screened in locally. Asia is considerably more 
developed now than it was twenty fi ve years ago, at the time 
of the Comprehensive Plan of Action. Today the UNHCR 
is encouraging states in the region to resettle and integrate 
refugees.
Malaysia has agreed to regularize of the status of some 
one million migrant workers through a registration process. 
Th e UNHCR is encouraging Malaysia to do the same with 
its asylum seeker population.
Respect for human rights
Human rights violations against Tamils in Sri Lanka should 
cease. Th e best solution to any refugee problem is removing 
the root causes which generate the refugee outfl ow.
Th e response to the Tamil refugee situation then should 
be threefold. One is to promote respect for human rights of 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. Th e second is to promote respect for 
refugee rights in countries of proximate refuge. Th e third is 
to contribute to resettlement, sharing refugee responsibility 
with countries of proximate refuge.
Th e traditional resettlement countries should not be 
expected to resettle all Tamil refugees. Yet, they should be 
part of the solution, resettle some.
Th e Government of Canada has got part of this message 
and made an active eff ort to promote human rights in Sri 
Lanka. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has said that at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth 
scheduled for next week he would advocate a boycott of 
a 2013 summit in Sri Lanka unless it improves its human 
rights record. Harper said:
“I have expressed concerns about the holding of the next 
Commonwealth summit in Sri Lanka … I intend to make clear 
to my fellow leaders of the Commonwealth that if we do not see 
progress in Sri Lanka in human rights I will not as Prime Minister 
be attending that Commonwealth summit. And I hope others will 
take a similar position.”3
Th e Government of Canada has also backed an independ-
ent investigation into war crimes committed by the Sri 
Lankan army in the fi nal phase of the civil war. Foreign 
Minister John Baird, according to a Globe and Mail report, 
told Sri Lanka’s Foreign Aff airs Minister, G.L. Peiris, at the 
UN in New York in September that Canada wants progress 
on human rights and post civil war reconciliation, pushing 
back, according to a summary provided by sources, against 
Mr. Peiris’s ‘trust us’ assurances4.
Bill C-4
Th e Government of Canada through Bill C-4 is working at 
cross purposes. Th e Bill proposes punitive measures against 
Tamil and other refugees. Th e proposed legislation would 
discourage smuggling by punishing the smuggled.
Th e proposed law provides for mandatory twelve months 
detention for every member of a designated arriving group 
of persons unless the refugee protection claim is fi nally 
determined earlier or the cabinet Minister responsible 
decides that there are exceptional circumstances which 
warrant the person’s release5. It further prohibits members 
of the designated groups from obtaining permanent resi-
dence until fi ve years aft er a claim for refugee protection6. 
Th e delay in obtaining permanent residence would lead to 
a delay in family reunifi cation. Th e proposed legislation 
denies to the designated claimants the right to appeal nega-
tive decisions other claimants have7.
Designation of a group may occur if the Minister has rea-
sonable grounds to suspect that, in relation to the arrival 
in Canada of a group, there has been, or will be, smuggling 
for profi t, or for the benefi t of, at the direction of or in asso-
ciation with a criminal organization or terrorist group8. 
Smuggling is defi ned as organizing, inducing, aiding or 
abetting the coming into Canada of one or more persons 
knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, their com-
ing into Canada is or would be in contravention of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act9.
Designation of an arriving group would be by the respon-
sible Minister and not the cabinet. Th e legislation sets out 
designation criteria, but neither the human rights record of 
the country fl ed nor the prior position of the Government 
on that record is proposed as a criterion.
One can see the problem this sort of legislation poses for 
human rights promotion. It violates the rights of refugees. 
Th e proposed legislation would mistreat people who have 
already suff ered far too much, piling mistreatment in the 
country of asylum onto the mistreatment in the country of 
nationality and the country of proximate refuge.
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Th e Refugee Convention prohibits detention of refugees 
on the sole basis that they arrived in the country illegally10. 
Th e proposed legislation does just that, holding out the 
threat of detention of refugees because of the manner in 
which they arrived.
Th e Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms pro-
hibits arbitrary detention11, cruel and unusual treatment12 
and deprivation of liberty in violation of the principles of 
fundamental justice13. Detaining the smuggled to stop the 
smugglers is all three—arbitrary, cruel and unusual, and a 
deprivation which is fundamentally unjust.
Th e criteria the courts have set out to prevent detention 
which is arbitrary, cruel and unusual and fundamentally 
unjust suggest that Bill C-4, once legislated, would be vul-
nerable to Charter challenge. In the case of Sahin in 1995 
Mr. Justice Rothstein set out a number of factors to consider 
when determining whether detention violates the Charter 
as fundamentally unjust. One of these factors is the reason 
for the detention. Another factor is the length of time in 
detention. He wrote:
“If an individual has been held in detention for some time as in 
the case at bar, and a further lengthy detention is anticipated, or 
if future detention time cannot be ascertained, I would think that 
these facts would tend to favour release.”14
Th e Government of Canada justifi es the legislation as 
removing the incentives of customers of smugglers. Calling 
prolonged detention, denial of family unity, unfair refugee 
determination procedures as disincentives to smugglers is a 
euphemism. One can assume that if we treat Tamil refugees 
in Canada worse than they are being treated in Sri Lanka 
or the countries of proximate refuge, they will not want to 
come here. However, we should not be violating the human 
rights of refugees in order to deter smuggling.
I mentioned earlier that refugee determination systems 
use evasive techniques to prevent a commitment to refugee 
protection in principle from translating into the numbers 
the plight of refugees warrant. One of these techniques is 
a pretense that refugees are irregular economic migrants, 
queue jumpers, moving from poor countries to rich coun-
tries without going through immigration procedures of the 
country of destination. Some support for Bill C-4 comes 
from this quarter, a mistaken belief that the boat people are 
devious queue jumping economic migrants, rather than the 
desperate victims they are.
Th e civil war in Sri Lanka was sparked by systematic 
discrimination and exclusion by elements of the major-
ity against the Tamil minority. Th e violent Tamil Tiger 
response does not excuse the mistreatment which generated 
it. Now that the Government of Sri Lanka forces have won 
the civil war, the very mistreatment of the Tamil minority 
which engendered it has become more cruel. Th is is a vic-
tory without magnanimity.
Th e Canadian legislation is bad in principle. But it is even 
worse in context. It says to the Government of Sri Lanka, go 
ahead, mistreat the Tamil minority. We don’t care.
Because the legislation was introduced in response to the 
Tamil arrivals, the legislation sends a message to Sri Lanka 
that we are not concerned about the mistreatment of your 
Tamil population. We are more concerned about our own 
borders and entry policy than what happens to Tamils back 
home.
Th e current Government has expressed concern about 
human rights violations infl icted on Tamils. Yet, when the 
victims of the failure to follow Canadian advice arrived on 
our shores, the response of the Government of Canada was 
to detain the arrivals en masse under the current legislation 
and propose legislation which would, in the future, impose 
a host of obstacles to the protection and settlement of such 
a group. While it is uncertain who in the future would be 
designated under the legislation, it is apparent that the gov-
ernment of the day, if the legislation had been in place at the 
time, would have designated the 76 Tamil arrivals aboard 
the MV Ocean Lady in October 2009 and the 492 aboard 
the MV Sun Sea in August 2010.
Th e proposed legislation is retroactive to March 2009. 
Th e Bill states that a designation of a group for the purpose 
of mass detention may be made in respect of an arrival in 
Canada aft er March 31, 200915. Th e Tamil refugees aboard 
the MV Ocean Lady have, to my knowledge, all been 
released. Th ose aboard the MV Sun Sea have for the most 
part been set free. Th e enactment of the legislation would 
give the Government the power retroactively to throw into 
jail the passengers of both these ships. Th e very choice of the 
date March 2009 suggests that this was the intent.
One reason for the mistreatment of asylum seekers in 
Asia is the pressure put on those countries by resettlement 
countries. Another reason is the poor example resettlement 
countries give.
As the Comprehensive Plan of Action at the time of the 
Vietnamese boat people showed, part of the solution lies 
with the countries of proximate refuge. Th e solution now 
is not necessarily the same as the solution then. All the 
same, the contribution countries of proximate refuge have 
to make to the solution can not be ignored.
Th e logic behind C-4 is to discourage new arrivals like 
those aboard the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea. 
Aside from the cruelty of the means, it is likely to have a per-
verse eff ect, leading countries of proximate refuge to mimic 
its cruelty and prompting asylum seekers in those countries 
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to fl ee in much the same way the passengers of the Ocean 
Lady, Sun Sea and Elysia did.
At the time of second reading of Bill C-49, the predeces-
sor of Bill C-4, the previous Parliament, in October 2010 
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said:
“we have begun preliminary discussions with our international 
partners, including Australia, which obviously has a great stake 
in this issue, and with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees to pursue the possibility of some form of regional 
protection framework in the Southeast Asian region. In part that 
would entail encouraging the countries now being used as transit 
points for smuggling and traffi  cking to off er at least temporary 
protection to those deemed by the UN in need of protection and 
then for countries such as Canada to provide, to some extent, rea-
sonable resettlement opportunities for those deemed to be bona 
fi de refugees, which is something we are pursuing.”
Th e Minister went on to justify the need for the proposed 
legislation on the basis that this solution was mid to long 
term and something about smuggling had to be done now. 
Yet, making matters worse for the customers of smugglers 
in countries of destination is not a workable shortcut.
Th e mistreatment the refugees receive in their home coun-
tries and countries of proximate refugee is real, immedi-
ate, experienced. Th e threat of mistreatment Bill C-4 holds 
out, even if realized, will always be for the smuggled only a 
potential, and one, we can be sure, smugglers will disguise 
and misrepresent.
One form of abuse refugees in countries of proximate 
refuge suff er is exploitation by smugglers. Th at exploitation 
will not end because the smuggled are mistreated in coun-
tries of resettlement. On the contrary, that mistreatment 
will make the exploitation even more pernicious.
Smuggling customer disincentivization will come only 
from making matters better for refugees back home and in 
countries of proximate refuge. If Tamils are not being per-
secuted in Sri Lanka, if they are being treated humanely in 
countries of proximate refuge, the incentive for them to hire 
smugglers will evaporate.
Th e eff orts of the Government of Canada to promote 
human rights in Sri Lanka are commendable and should be 
encouraged. Th e Bill C-4 initiative is deplorable and should 
be dropped. What should take its place is a Canadian initia-
tive to organize a new comprehensive plan of action with 
countries of proximate refuge in Asia. Th is time the plan 
should provide for respect for refugee rights in countries 
of proximate refuge and a sharing of refugee resettlement 
amongst traditional resettlement countries and countries in 
the region.
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